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ARGUMENT ONE
THE COURT ACTED OUTSIDE OF THE PLEADINGS IN AFARDING
JUDGMENT TO PLAINTIFF ON A PURPORTED CONTRACT THAT WAS
STRUCK A m A DIFFERENT TIME, INVOLVING DIFFERENT PARTIES
AND FOR A DIFFERENT AMOUNT, THAN WAS PLEAD.
On pa<*e eight and nine of the Memorandum Decision
is the following:
I believe that the evidence clearly preponderates in showin? that Plaintiff performed substantial accountinp; service
at Brooks1 renuest over a number of years for x^hich it
was not compensated and a gross injustice would result
under the facts and circumstances of this case to allow
Brooks to escape complete liability therefor on the sole
basis that such services should have been paid by the
various business entities operated by him. However, I
note that after the parties had agreed to settle the
account for $6,000.00 with monthlv payments thereon of
$200.00 to be paid, and two such payments were made in
April and May, 1983, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on
June 6, 1983, without prior notice that the agreed to
settlement was no longer in effect. Both parties x^ere
at fault in the method by which the account was handled.
I thus find that issues on Plaintiff's complaint in
favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendant and
award judgment in the amount of $5,600.00 with interest
thereon and costs. No attorneys fees are awarded.
Defendant submits that the Court acted totally outside
of the pleadings in the case, and has awarded judgment to the
p

laintiff on a purported agreement and contract which was not

breached nor was the same in default.
This is especiallv reflected in the Court's own words
on pages 15 and 16 of the fourth day of trial:
. . . Mr. Brooks testimony was to the effect that
he was repeatedly was asking for a breakdown of the
charges with respect to the various companies for
which that particular charge related. v ou mentioned
the agreement he had with the secretary. It certainly

supports his position that the individual charges
^or work done were to be paid by the entity for
which the work was done, you see, and I view Mr.
Brooks' position, yes, Mr. Tebbs was employed by
him to do work but it included work for each of
these entities, as well as himself. And his testimony was consistent throughout, I think, that he
expected each individual entity to pay its proportionate part of Mr. Tebbs! services performed for that
particular entity and that it was to be charged to
that entitv and had it been charged, would have been
paid by that entity, you see. And that has been his
comnlaint throughout "the trial, as I see it, was
that he was never able to pet Mr. Tebbs to give him
a breakdown on the entity for which these particular
charges that he was billing him f or could be attributed.
"Defendant submits that it is critical to note that this
is a comment made bv the Court a^ter both sides had rested.

There

was no additional evidence submitted to the Court a^ter this point
in the trial, and so there would be no new or additional evidence
submitted to the Court which could give rise to a different
position.
Notwithstanding, the Court at pa^e eie;ht of the Memorandum Decision states that since ^lainti^ had done a lot of work
and since it would be a p-ross injustice to allow Mr. Brooks to
escape comnlete liability, plaintiff should o-et something.
The problem is that the Court awarded iudoment to
p

laintiff in a sxtm certain and on the basis o^ a purported agree-

ment which was never breached and not in default.
ten-day summons was

served

Note the

on the Defendant some nine (9) days

approximately after the May Payment was made, ie: M ay 13, 1983.

Plaintiff suggests in its brief, that the Court ax^arded
judgment on what was set forth in the pleadings with only the
amount that was different.
Defendant submits that this is without merit.
Defendant and ^lainti^ had agreed on the sum of $6,000.00
total at $200.00 a month.

Defendant had fulfilled both the letter

and snirit of the agreement, when Defendant is hit U D with a
lawsuit demanding $12,324.47 ^or services that were allegedly
contracted for lonp- before the above stated agreement.
A^ter the Court heard the testimonv of the alleged
original agreement, it awarded judpnient not at all on that basis,
but on the basis that a ?ross injustice would occur if Mr. Brooks
did not t>ay something.
It iust so turns out, that Mr. Brooks was already t>aying
that something, at tx*zo hundred dollars a month, as agreed.
Now the whole amount is reduced to judgment and with
interest and costs.
Bottomline, M r. Brooks is ordered to nay a sum certain
not because he agreed to do so, as alleged by ¥r.

p

oole in the

comnlaint; not because he had renuested and nersonally received
accounting services to the tune df £12,324.^7; not because demand
xtfas made ut>on the Defendant and "he bailed and recused to nay the
same."
No, iud**ment was awarded to ^lainti^^ because it would be
unjust not to p-ive ^laintif* something.

As noted throughout the trial, Defendant objected to
all of the testimony regarding amounts owed, because there was
not a single shred o^ evidence, not even a mention, as to the
reasonable value of the services rendered.
Mr. ^oole took the position that the amount due was
billed and the bills were venerated in the regular course and
scope o^ the business, and then never so much as attempted to
establish the reasonable value of the services.

Note Ex. 2-"°

In fact, he could not because the time spent was never
made a part of the record, and so he could not have established
the reasonable value of the services allegedly performed.
This involved an alleged agreement to perform services
and then bill for the same.

It is not like an agreement where

there is an agreed amount due once all of the work is completed.
Po there could not have been a final amount agreed upon by
M

r. "Brooks ^rom the beginning.
^ence, with no evidence as to the reasonable value of

the alleged services, there can be no award in any amount either
on a breach of contract theory as alleged in the complaint nor
on an uniust enrichment theorv as set ^orth by the Court, because
the Court could only speculate as to the value of the alleged
enrichment.
This is so because there was no evidence as to the time
expended for the work alleged to have been completed, and there
was no evidence as to the fair market value of the said time.

Defendant respectfully submits that the Court did not
award iud^ment to the plaintiff on the basis o* the pleadings.
In fact, the express statement in the pleadings that demand had
been made, and the Defendant had failed and refused to pay the
same was the exact opposite o^ what the evidence was and what
the Court found.
furthermore, the Defendant states throughout his testimony that the onlv reason he was payin<* the £6,000.00 was because
of a concern about M r. ^ebbs personally, so that Mr. Tebbs would
not have this charged back to him within the plaintiffTs corporation.
Fence, the subseouent agreement was not even with the
"Plaintiff, but was between vhc. Tebbs personally and the Defendant.
defendant submits that there can be no Question, that
the Court stepped well outside of the pleadings in awarding
iud^ment to the ^lainti^f for monies involved in the Personal
agreement with Mr. ^ebbs.
Hence, Defendant respectfully submits that the Court
acted outside of the pleadings in awarding iudment to plaintiff
on a purported contract that was struck at a di^erent time,
involving di^^erent parties and for a different amount.

ARGUMENT ^ 0
THE SUPPORTED SUBSEOUFN^ A^RFFMENT FOR T HE ^A^fFNT
OF $6,000.00 AT $200.00 *ER MONTH WAS NOT BLEACHED
BY THE DEFENDANT; THE COURT MADE NO SUCH FINDING
^HAT IT HAD BFEN BRFACHED, AND THFRE WAS NO COMPETENT
FVIDENCF THAT IT HAD BEFN BRFACHED.
Plaintiff suggests that Brooks was delinauent on the
two payments that were made on the $6,000.00 agreement.

He

flat out states that Judge Croft so found, and that there was
sufficient evidence ^or such a finding.

p

laintiff further

su^pests that Judge Cro^t had clearly held that both payments
were delinauent so there was a breach o^ this subsecuent contract.
Defendant submits that Jud^e Croft made no such findin*?, and that was surely not part of his ruling.

Note page

nine of the Memorandum Decision:
However, I note that after the parties had agreed to
settle the account for $6,000.00 with monthly payments
thereon o^ ^200.00 to be t>aid, and two such payments
were made in Anril and May, 1°83, plaintiff filed this
lawsuit on June 6, 1983, without orior notice that
the agreed to settlement was no longer in effect.
Defendant further submits that not only is it incorrect
to suggest that Judee Cro^t so held, but that there was absolutely
no competent evidence to that e^ect.
That is to say, that there was no competent evidence that
the payments were to be received by the first of each month, only
that thev were to be received durinp- each month, furthermore the

agreement was to the e^ect that there was to be no interest.
Mr. poole suggests that the navments were made but
late in his onenin°- argument on na^e 3 o^ dav one.

On page 9^

and following, of day one, Mr. Tebbs testified that he had no
conversation with Mr. Brooks regarding any agreement that the
payment was to be received on or about the ^irst o^ each month.
M

r. Tebbs testified that the agreement, if any, was struck

between Mrs. Montgomery and Mr. Brooks.
T

hen on na?e 130 of the ^irst day of trial, Mrs. Mont-

gomery testified that the payments were to be made each month,
with no reference as to when they were to be paid during the mon
Mr. Brooks testified on oa^e 24 on the second day of
trial that he was to make a payment each month and again on
pa^e 48 o^ the same day, with no reference as to when, except
merely during the month.
However, on page 55 of the second day of trial, he
states that as reelected in Exhibits Jh^L-Ti and ^A35-D, he made
his two nayments on time, one for April and one ^or May, and
then is sued with the ten-day summons on M ay 27, 1983.

Also

note page 48 of the second day of trial.
On page 53 of the second day o^ trial, Brooks testified
that there had been no contact regarding not having complied
with the agreement, before he was hit U P with the lawsuit.
Defendant submits that it is significant to note that
the agreement was to the e-^ect that there was to be no interest
charged on the £6,000.00. However Judge Croft awarded interest

at the highest legal rate allowable.
On nages 80 and 81 0? the second day of trial, Mr.
Brooks testified that he had an agreement with Mr. Tebbs that
he would not be charged any interest, and this was agreed to
not just once, but had been the subiect of their conversation
"at lease two or three" times.
Hence, the only comnetent evidence on when the payments
were to be made, was to the effect that they could be paid at
any time during the month, and this comes by way of the testimony
of Mrs, Montgomery and Mr. Brooks.

M s o , the only competent

evidence regarding the issue of interest is by way of M r . Brooks
and that is to the effect that there was to be none.
Defendant therefore, resDect^ully submits that there was
no breach o^ this agreement, he was totally current at the time
that he was sued and furthermore, based unon the evidence there
was to be no interest on the same.
Defendant submits that the reason that the Court did
not nick this up, as well as missinp- some very critical evidence
throughout, especially on the counterclaim, is because the Court
could not hear.
Through the course of the entire trial, the Honorable
Bryant Croft was not well, he had a cold and had had it for some
time.

Each day that evidence was submitted, the Court suggested

that it had a nroblem hearing the evidence.
On na^e 78 o^ the first day of trial Judge Croft states:

T

FF COURT1: My problem, gentlemen, I have been sick
since last Thursday or Friday and not feeling verygood at the present time. Whether or not I could go
through the rest of the afternoon, remains to be
seen. I will do the best I can. It may be, if we
don't finish about midafternoon, we may have to
recess until tomorrow.
Then on page 62 of the second day of trial, the Court
flat out states that it can not hear because of his cold.
"Plaintiff submits that not only was there substantial
evidence on certain points as stated in this and the Appellant's
Briefs, but the Court really was not well, and could not hear
as reflected throughout the entire trial.
On the first day of trial at oaee 108, the Judge
misses the point altogether.

At page 11 Q the Court states that

it is going to have to quit for the day because of his health.
On the same page is another example of the Court not being able
to hear.

On page 121 the Court receives Ex. 28, without even

inauiring if there was an objection.

On page 123 is another

example of the Court not hearing the evidence.

Finally on

page 133, the Court concluded the trial for the day because of
the problems.
As an example of the problems on the second day, note
page 128 where the Court asked that the evidence be repeated.
On the third day of trial, at oage 23, the Court had
a problem hearing the evidence.

On page 38 of the same day the

Court again states that it has a nroblem and can not hear.
more at nap-e 36 the Court states that it has a problem, and
finally on page 42 the Droblem is ap-ain reflected.

Once

All in all, the first three (3) davs were the days
that evidence was submitted.

The fourth day of trial was only

"for closing; arsument, so there was no evidence submitted on
that day.
Defendant submits that Judp-e Croft pushed himself
too far when he was not well, and as a result some critical
evidence which is addressed in the Memorandum Decision is flat
out not the case.
For example, the Court states that each party was
equally at fault in how the accountant handled his own account.
Defendant submits that such a claim has no

basis in the evidence.

For this reason, Defendant reauests that the matter be
heard a^ain completely, so that he can have an adjudication of
the matter on all of the evidence.
For this reason coupled with the ^act that the Defendant
did not breach any subsecruent agreement, the matter should be
remanded to the District Court with instructions to the effect
that the complaint be dismissed with prejudice and upon the
merits, and iudgment be entered ^or the Defendant on the Counterclaim in the sum of $61,500.00, should this Court rule that a
rehearing of the matter on the merits be unnecessary.

AROTJMENT HTHRFF
THF*E IS NO MERIT TO PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL SUGGESTION
THAT MR. ^EBPS AGREED T O BILL BROOKS INDIVIDUALLY;
THAT NO RFOUEST FOR ITEMIZATION WAS MADE B v BROOKS
IN WRITING, AND THAT BROOKS DID NOT RESPOND TO THE
BILLINGS IN TJRTTING.
Plaintiff's counsel suggests in his brief that Mr.
Tebbs aereed to bill Brooks individually; that no reouest for
itemization was made by Brooks in writing, and that Brooks
did not respond to the billings in writinp.
Defendant submits that this whole line of reasoning
is without merit.
Mr. Tebbs stated on nao-e 57 of the ^irst day o^ trial,
that he was aware of at least one renuest for an itemization and
that there could have been more.
He reiterates the same on page 71 and SI and 82 of the
first day of trial and admits that Exhibit 22-D reflected the
same as a document coming from the "Plaintiff's files.
Mr. ^ebbs also, admitted that Exhibit 25-D, was a document coming from the Plaintiff's own records reflecting the
reauest for separate bills.

Note page 94 of day one.

Mr. Brooks testified on na(ge 31 o^ the second day of
trial, that his accounting system was created by M r . Tebbs,
which itself called for a pavment to the accountants, and then
continuing on page 32, M r . Brooks testified that he had reciuested
the bill for that singular purpose on several occasions.
Mr. Brooks testified on Page 32 on the second day of trial,
that he did not commingle any funds from the separate entities and
that the profit and loss statements prepared bv Plaintiff called

for payments to ^laintif^.

Vet still there was no itemization.

On paee 37 of the second day of trial, Mr. Brooks
testified that he told "Plaintiff that he would not pay them any
monies until he received an itemization on each bill for each
entity.
Mr. Tebbs was doine the taxes ^or M r . Brooks and the
other companies and so he was surely ax^are how the businesses
were operated.

Note nap;e 39 o^ the second day of trial.

On pape 41 and pape 105 of the second day of trial,
M

r. Brooks and a secretarv of the different companies, Candy

Tabor testified that each entitv had a separate checking account,
and that Mr. Brooks never paid a business debt with funds from
a different business nor did he nay business debts with his
personal account or visa versa.
This, of course, "Plaintiff well knew because of the
tax preparation ^or each entity, and the sale of each entity,
and the way that they were sold.

Note pap;e 64 of the second

dav of trial.
On pa<?e 66 of the second day of trial, M r . Brooks
testified that he had submitted written reauests -For statements
in the sale of the Ice Cream Ftore, ^anderiq;ht, Inc. (pizza
Loft and "Pizza Wapon) and the New vQrk pasta Co. to "°laintiff.
On the second dav of trial, Candy Tabor testified
that as an employee of the comnanies she was paid separatelv
by each entitv.

Candy stated on pape 97 of the second day of trial,
that she was present when Mr. Brooks asked for an itemization
-From Mr. Tebbs, once in Aueust, 1978, once in October, 1^78, and
a third time in early 1979.

T

hese, as well as other times,

note paq;e 110 of the second day of trial.
Even the Court inquired as to how many times and what
Mr. Tebbs would respond after he had committed to produce the
itemizations and then had ^ailed to do so.
On the second day of trial at nape 113, is the
following:
T

HE COURT: when you talked to Mr. Tebbs and made
your recuest pursuant to direction from Mr. Brooks
to p-ive you a breakdown on the billinps, what did
he say?
THE WITNESS:
^ E COURT:

He said, "I will pet you one."

And did he do so?

THE WITNESS: Well, I don't think so.
THF COURT": You never recall receiving one then?
THE WITNESS: No.
THE COURT: Did you ever, in discussing with him a^ain,
you said, "Well, you said you would send me one and you
didn't" or words to that effect?
^HE ™TTNFSS:

Rieht, and he said, "I will do it."

On page one of the fourth day of trial, the Honorable
Bryant Croft, made this comment before hearing closing argument:
. . . but it seems to me with resnect to the Plaintiff's
claim, a critical factor is what proof has been made as
to work specifically done for Mr. Brooks, as an individual
independent of what mi^ht have been done for any of his
entities?

Lastly, on paces 15, 16 and 17 of the fourth day of
trial Judce Cro^t swelled out all of the problems with the
evidence o* the Plaintiff's case.
In doing so, the Court pointed out what Defendant
believes to be the most obvious problem with the plaintiff?s
case, and that it that we have an accountant suing a defendant
for how the accountant himself handled his own account with
the defendant.
Defendant herein stronely ur^es this Court to review
the Court1s comments on paces 15, 16 and 17, of day ^our of
the trial in coniunction with the actual ruling of the Court,
because Defendant submits that this is dispositive o^ the notion
that the Court awarded iudo^nent on an uniust enrichment theory
as is discussed in Argument One, above.

ARHUMFNT FOTTO
THE COURT SHOULD HAVE AWARDED DEFENDANT
$61,500.00 ON THE RASIS OF THE COUNTERCLAIM.
Defendant suggests that the singular most "ftross
iniustice11 x*as what the lower Court did with the Counterclaim.
^lainti^ in his brie^ suggests that the information
which was generated ^or the bonding coirroany was inadeauate, so
the timeliness of the delivery of the same becomes immaterial.
He p-oes on and suepcests that even i* it were material, Mr.
Brooks did nothing to pet a cash bond during the two hours he
had before the bid openinp.
Defendant submits that this is all very misleading.
Defendant reiterates his position so that there can
be no ouestion as to the promixate cause of his damages.
Defendant contends that if the accounting, however
inadeauate, x^ould have been delivered where it should have been
and when it should have been, he would have been able to secure
a different type of bond and would have been awarded the iob
which would have rendered him the £61,500.00 prayed for in the
Motion to Amend the pleadinps, to conform to the evidence, made
by the Defendant's counsel at the end of the evidence. Note
page 38 of the third day of trial.
Mr. Hrooks had been involved with other l.v.'D.

pro-

iects before and after this bid, and had dealth personally with
the project manager for the bid in question, Mr. Richard Drows
rep-ardino- the same.

Note page 3 o^ the second day of trial.

Mr. Brooks was specifically invited to bid the subject
project, which was not open to public biddine, but only to a
sellect few who had what Mr. prows called a pre-screening.

Note

pages 5 and 9 of the second day of trial and Ex. 29-D
Mr. Prows testified that he did not know of any reason
why Mr. Brooks would be disaualified or otherwise unacceDtable
to bid this iob.

Note page 8 of the second day of trial.

This

is very important because Mr. Prows along with his company was
the District Manager for this Droject, and that without exception,
when ^rowswood approved of a bidder, the same x^as awarded accordingly.

Note page 11 of the second day of trial.
It is important to note that there were five individual

bids for this overall I.p.p. project.
for three of the five bids.

Mr. Brooks had submitted

He attempted to bid a fourth which

would have been a rnrofit to him in the sum of $61,500.00; this
is the subject of the Count erclaim.

The onlv nart that Mr. Brooks

did not attempt to bid was one where Mr. Brooks1 supplier was
directly bidding the project, and so Mr. Brooks did not attempt to
bid that part.
Therefore, on page 13 of the second day of trial it is
especially critical to note that the District Manager, ^rowswood,
had approved the Defendant's bids on each of the other three
that he bid, and he was awarded everyone of the same.
Mr. Brooks had assisted drafting the plans and specifications for the project.

Note pa^e 3 and 5 of the third day of

trial, also Exhibit #45-D. In addition note Exhibit 29-D and
page 10, regarding the invitation directed specifically to Defend-

ant to bid this job.
Defendant testified that he had done four I."P."P.
projects, one before the one that is the subiect of the
Counterclaim and three after.

Note page 2 of the third day

of trial.
Defendant testified that the one that he did before
the one that is the subject of the Counterclaim was for the
sum of $550,000.00.

Note page 3 o^ the third day of trial.

So it would not be fair to say that the bid reflected in the
Counterclaim for approximately $6 75,000.00 was beyond his
experience, and that he had been doing small stuff before and
now was taking on some biR stuff, nor that he was now taking
something on with which he was unfamiliar.

Note Exhibit 30-D

The bid which is the subiect of the Counterclaim was
for the delivery and installation of fixtures and furnishings,
and so it was merely a matter of finding the best price and
then delivering the item, so all of the costs, etc., were finite,
exact and complete at the outset.
"Plaintiff suggests throughout his brief that the profit
to the Defendant, as asserted in the Counterclaim was not
established at the time of trial, and that the Court could only
speculate as to the same.
Nothing could be further from the truth.
At paee 27 of the third day of trial the Defendant
spelled out exactly what his profit was, and how he derived the
same.

In fact, Defendant's counsel attempted to establish
without question the exact profit beyond that as reflected on
page 27 of the third day of trial, and the Court on page 28
and 29 of the same day, would not allow this same.

Note

also pa^e 65 o? the ^ourth day of trial as well as Ex. 46-D.
There can be no auestion that 1* Mr. Brooks had had
his bond so that he could bid the proiect, Mr. Brooks would
have been awarded the same, as he was low bidder, at $676,000.00
Note pages 10 and 11 o^ the second day of trial.
The onlv element preventing M r . Brooks ^rom bidding
and ultimately being awarded the project, and hence his
$61,500.00 was that he did not have a bidders bond for the same
by 2:00 P.M., on June 1, 1^82, at the time that the bids were
opened.
On page 11 of the second day of trial, Mr. Brooks
testified that he had met with ^laintiff regarding the accountin^ that had to be done and timely delivered, Ions before it was
needed.
On page 17 of the same day, Mr. Brooks testified that
he had informed Randy Jensen (part of the plaintiff!s corporation)
that the information had to be submitted to the bonding company
at 8:00 A.M., and Randy said that he would take care of it.
On page 117 of the second day of trial, Randy Jensen
testified that he was aware of the emergency that existed in

seeing that the work was done and delivered on time.

In fact,

he testified that he worked through the weekend and holiday to
make sure that it was completed, so that it could be delivered
on time.

Note page 118 of the second day of trial.
On page 120 of the second day of trial, Randy Jensen,

went so far as to say that not only did he know that it had to
be delivered at the right place and at the right time, but he
had actually committed to Mr. Brooks personally, that it would
be done.
On page 18 o^ the third day of trial, Mr. Brooks
testified that he had reauested Randy to call him at home
when the work was done, so that Mr. Brooks would not have to
worry about petting an alternative bond, and Pandy Jensen did
in fact call him on Saturday to assure Mr. brooks that it
was all taken care of.
On page 1 Q of the third day of trial, M r. Brooks
testified that R.andy had assured him that it would be delivered
to the bonding; company directly, by 8:00 A.M., on the day of
the bid opening.
Mr. Brooks testified that he called on the morning
of the bid opening to be sure that the same was delivered
and Randy had assured him that it was.
T-Then Mr. Brooks did not hear from the bonding company
by almost 12:00 noon, he called ^arl Brown o^ Carroon and Black,
(the bonding company) to see i f there was a problem, and Mr.

Brown stated that he had not received the documents.

Note

page 30 of the third day of trial.
Mr. Brooks called Randy a^ain, around 12:00 noon and
explained that Mr. Brown had not received the documents, and
Randy said that he would have to call Mr. Brooks back.

Note

page 31 of the third day of trial.
Randy then called "Mr. Brooks sometime later, and said
that they had in fact been delivered to the wrong place, that
they had been delivered to Mr. Brooks' office.

Note pap-e 32

of the third day of trial.
Mr. Brooks then asked where had they been delivered,
only to learn that apparently the ^lainti4^ had had the same
merely dropped inside the o^ices of the Defendant upside
down on the counter.

Note same pa^e 32.

To this point Mr. Brooks had been working frantically
in petting the bid itself readv, along with the other three bids
that he x^as submitting at the same time, and had relied on
p

laintiff and the assurances from Randy Jensen that it had been

worked out on Saturday,

*Jote paee 24 o^ the third day of trial.

When Brooks learned that the information needed was
not delivered timely he was furious.

Note page 125 of the second

dav of trial.
In fact, he explained to Pandy that the wronp- delivery
had probably cost him the $61,500.00 -job (profit).
138 of the second day of trial.

Note oage

Defendant submits that there is no Question that the
-Failure to deliver the documents to the right place and at the
right time, was the negligence of the Plaintiff.

Note pages

121 through 125 of the second day of trial.
At this point, plaintiff suggests in its brief, that
Mr. Brooks did nothing to secure a cash bond.
This is not so.
At nage 33 o^ the third day of trial, Mr. Brooks
testified that he immediately called the bank, a^ter learning
that the bonding company could not write the bond.
Mr. Brooks attempted to locate the two Deople at the
bank that cotild assist in getting a cash bond.
of the third day o^ trial.

Note page 34

Both of them were gone to lunch.

He then proceeded to draw on the ^unds that he had
in his own account at the bank, and got cash bonds for the
other three bids on the same overall proiect that he was ultimately awarded, and then rushed to the bid opening.

Note pages 33

through 35 of the third day of trial and also Exhibit &7-D.
Mr. Brooks did not submit his bid for CVH-10 because
he did not have the bidders bond nor did he have a cash bond.
Note page 36 of the third day of trial.
Mr. Brooks would have been low bidder however on the
CWH-10 if he were permitted to bid, and would have therefrom
$61,500.00 in profit.

For information sake, Mr. Brooks would have been
granted an overdraft position sufficient to nut together a
cash bond, if he would have had time to apnly for the same,
and if the two people had not gone to lunch.

Note Stanley

Hoffman's testimony on pages 146 through 153 of the second
day of trial.
To get a cash bond, Mr. Brooks would have had
to put up five per cent of the total price.

He had a bid

to submit in the sum of $676,000.00 but he had $500,000.00
of that already covered by a single supplier.

So all he needed

was five percent of $176,000.00 or $8,800.00.

Note t>age 23

of the third day of trial.
Stanley Hoffman testifed that he would have given
Mr. Brooks the cash for the amount on that day in nuestion,
if ^r. Brooks had been able to apply for the same.

Note

specifically page 158 of the second day of trial.
Bottomline, had plaintiff delivered the accounting
timely to Carroon and Black, however inadeauate, to get a bond,
and even though the same was rejected, Mr. Brooks would have
had sufficient time in which to secure a cash bond to the
tune of $10,000.00 (even though all he needed was approximately
$8,800.00) and the job would have been his.
Hence, he lost $61,500.00 because of the negligence of
the Plaintiff, and the Court would not allow further evidence
on the snecificity and particularity of the same, yet held
that it would have to speculate as to the exact lost, hence no
recovery.

Note page 65 o^ the fourth day of trial.
Note as well, that the Defendant asserted two causes

of action, one for breach of contract and one for negligence,
as set forth above.
CONCLUSION
The Complaint in this case involves a situation
where an accountant is suing a defendant for how the accountant himself handled the defendant's account.
Plaintiff was aware without question, that the bill
its was p-enerating over a substantial period of time was for
the independant companies because it was the one that set U P
the accounting system for each of the same, each system calling
for a payment to the accountants.
Plaintiff was involved in how the various entities
were sold.

Plaintiff had advised the Defendant on how to sell

the stock and not merely the assets so that there would not be
a problem with lingering bills, like the one that is the subject
of the complaint.
Plaintiff had assisted in the design of a form letter
to be submitted to each creditor at the time of the sale, and
both Mr. Brooks and Candy Tabor testified that Plaintiff itself
received such a letter.
Defendant submits that it interesting to note, that
no one, not even the plaintiff disputes that at least some
requests were made for itemizations on the account.
It seems inconceivable that an accountant can do the
taxes for different independant companies, some corporations, some

partnerships, some individual, etc., and claim that he did
not know that each was paying its own way, when they each had
separate checking accounts, when there never was any commingling
between the accounts and the accounting system itself was both
originated by the accountant himself, and operated for some time
bv the accountant - until the time that the said businesses are
sold, and then the sale(s) themselves are under the direction
of the accountant.
^laintif^ asserted a claim ^or Si?,324.47, and the
Court awarded "judgment -for the ^lainti^f for $5,600.00.
The said $5,600.00 constituted an agreement ^or
a different amount, with different parties and was struck at
a totally different time.
Defendant submits that the Court should reverse
the -judgment of the lower Court on the Complaint and enter
iudgment on the same to the Defendant on the merits and with
prejudice, as no cause of action.
As to the Counterclaim, Defendant established that
but -Por the negligence o* the ^lainti"^ he would have made a
clear profit in the sum o^ $61,500.00.
T

here is no dispute as to the negligence, the only

dispute is to the damages, and that is onlv to two issues:
(1) Were the damages proximately caused by the negligence of the
^lainti^ and (2) Are the damages speculative?
Defendant submits that there is no Question that had
the accounting, however inadeauate, been delivered on time, then
he could have acquired a cash bond.

There is no speculation as

to this because the banker himself who would have made the
decision for the same, testified that he would have issued a
cash bond to Mr. Brooks, if Mr. Brooks had been able to apply
for one timely.
Defendant further sumits that there is no question
that he was cut o ^ ^rom establishing his damages with any greater
degree of particularity.
The bid was a suppliers bid.
are easily established.

T

Therefore the damages

he cost of purchase and the cost o?

delivery.
Mr. Brooks established the same with exactness.
Therefore, Defendant reauests that this Court enter
judgment for the Defendant in the sum o f 661,500.00 as requested
in the Motion to Amend the pleadings to conform to the evidence,
timely made.
Respectfully submitted this 14th day oJP^5ctabejrT^1985.
)i
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
TEBBS, SMITH & ASSOCIATES,
a Utah corporation,

:

Plaintiff,
:

MEMORANDUM DECISION

:

CIVIL NO. C 83-4210

vs .
SKIPP BROOKS,
Defendant.
The above case came on for trial before the court on April
18, 19 and 23, 1984 with Dennis K. Poole appearing as counsel for
plaintiff and John Walsh appearing as counsel for defendant, at
the conclusion of which the court took its decision under advisement
and having considered the same, now renders its decision thereon.
The case involves two different sets of issues, one set arising
under plaintiff's complaint and the other arising under defendant's
counterclaim, the former being separate and apart from the latter.
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM
Plaintiff by its complaint seeks to recover the sum of
$12,324.47, alleged to be the amount defendant is obligated to
plaintiff for accounting services rendered over a period of several
years beginning in 1977.

The fact that defendant requested the

services is not in dispute nor is there any controversy over the
quality of the services rendered.

The dispute centers around the

fact that plaintiff contends that from the beginning of its work
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for defendant and his various entities, plaintiff looked soley
to defendant individually for its compensation regardless of the
work done, whereas defendant contends that a substantial part of
the accounting services performed were done for one or more of
his various business entities and that such work should have been
billed to and paid by the particular business entity for which
such work was done.
Unfortunately, the agreement was never reduced to writing
and each party places its own interpretation upon what was said
and done concerning the services rendered•

Their relationship

began in 1977 when Clem Tebbs, president of plaintiff, and a CPA
of 25 years experience, met with defendant Brooks at the latter's
request at which time Brooks told Tebbs he was involved in a number
of things and desired aid in his various entities, as he had had
problems with each and was concerned about such problems as well
as his own tax involvement.

Tebbs told Brooks he would work with

him, would get things together to see if he needed an accountant
and that because Brooks was in a tough financial situation at the
time, they would bill him for the work done and Brooks gave his
OK to begin the work.

The work began with a review of various

tax returns by plaintiff's employees, the goal being to aid Brooks
in whatever his interests were.

Tebbs testified there was no spec-

ific understanding that billings were to be based upon the entity
for which the work was done, but that it was stated that plaintiff
would bill Brooks who was to be responsible therefor.

Tebbs test-

ified he thought Brooks so stated at their initial interview.
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On the other side of the controversy Brooks testified in
substance that he contacted Tebbs in 1977 at the suggestion of
a mutual friend; that he told Tebbs he had some personal needs
as well as needs for his business entities and work was begun on
both; that Tebbs set up an accounting system with categories; that
he and his secretary were both concerned about there being separate
billings for work done for each entity as each entity had to pay
its own way and that if Tebbs had told him he would be personally
liable for all work done, he could not have afforded to have the
work done; that he asked Tebbs many times to give him a breakdown
on work done for each entity and when he asked Tebbs why no bills
had been sent, Tebbs told him not to worry about it as it was all
coming together.
From the exhibits received it is apparent that the first
billing was dated March 5, 1979, some 18 to 24 months after the
initial meeting.

This billing was addressed to Brooks invidi-

dually and read as follows:
Accounting, tax and management services as follows:
Working with IRS on tax case

$2,940.00

Recapping and correcting accounting records
and filing tax returns for 1977 on your various
companies.
Setting up a new accounting and bookkeeping system
Accounting and tax services including
financial statements for 1978
Management studies made during 1977-1978 and
year to date 1979.
BALANCE DUE

2,270.00
360.00
1,240.00
480.00
$7,290.00
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Information contained in various other exhibits received
into evidence bearing upon charges and payments made and upon which
plaintiff's claim is based may be summarized as follows:
A bill dated July 1, 1979, reflected the balance of §7,290.00
and added four items:

$963 for work on IRS tax case, $S70 for

recapping the account records and filing 1978 tax returns for various
companies, $747 for accounting and tax services including financial
statements for 1978, and $470 for other management services for
a subtotal of $3,050 which, less $600 in payments, left a balance
due of $9,740 though May, 1979.
A bill dated August 30, 1979 added $2,200 for accounting,
tax and management services from June 30, 1979 through August 30,
1979, for a total due of $11,940.
A bill dated March 10, 1980 added $2,007.4 7 to the prior
total for accounting, tax and management services from August 30,
1979 through January 31, 1980, for a total due of $13,927.47.
A letter dated January 7, 1981, from plaintiff advised Brooks
Clem had directed that a merchandise credit for a diamond and carpet
totaling $2,217.24 be deducted from the balance owing of $13,144.22.
It also stated that a work in progress balance of $444.90 was being
written off and no charges would be made for the entire year of
1981 because plaintiff had obtained the "Osmond" account "by way
of your introduction".
A letter from plaintiff signed by Lee Montgomery dated April
17, 1981, mentioned the January letter and stated they had yet
to receive a response to their request for payment of the $10,926.98
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Montgomery testified at trial stating she had had

many telephone conversations with Brooks about payment in which
he acknowledged the debt and said if he ever got any money he would
pay it, but on cross examiantion she testified that Brooks had
told her that it was his position that if the accounting work was
done for one of his companies, that company should pay for such
accounting services.

Who, other than Brooks himself, had the resp-

onsibility of paying such bills was never established by evidence.
On August 19, 1981, plaintiff sent another letter to Brooks
asking him to pay $400 per month on the account and that if he
did so, it would avoid an interest charge of 1.5% per month.
A statement to Brooks dated January 21, 1982, showed a prior
balance of $11,136.75, charges of $2,007.47 for acccounting, tax
and management services from August 30, 1979 through January 31,
1980, a merchandise credit of $2,217.24 for a balance due of
$10,926.98.
A similar billing was sent July 21, 1982, adding interest
charges to that date of $1,184.67, a discount of $300 for payment
made by July 31, 1982 for a balance of $11,811.65.
On December 22, 1982 Tebbs wrote a letter to Brooks saying
his partners had given him until the end of December to work out
a payment plan, that his account was the oldest account serviced
without even a token monthly payment, and asking Brooks to work
with him on it.
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The next letter was dated Jasnuary 7, 1983 from plaintiff's
counsel stating he had been retained with respect to an account
balance then stated to be $12,724.47 which included prior amounts
plus interest charges for the last five months of 1982.
On January 25, 1982 (should be 1983) a letter by plaintiff
acknowledged Brooks1 agreement to pay $200 per month lor six months
and then an amount to be thereafter agreed upon.

A similar letter

of March 25, 1983, acknowledged Brooks' commitment to pay $200
per month beginning April 1# 1983 but suggested it should be $300
or $400 per month in light of the amount owed.

Two payments of

$200 were thereafter paid, one by check dated April 5, 1983, and
one by check dated May 18, 1983, both drawn on Brooks Industries,
Inc. bank accounts.

There was evidence that prior to these two

payments it had been agreed between^the partie^jthat the account
had been settled for $6,000 based upon such monthly payments being
made.
Computer printouts were placed into evidence from dates
beginning 1-31-79 through 1-31-84.

The third sheet dated 3-31-79

showed an amount of $7,290.00 transferred from "work-in-progress" ^
accounts receivable which was the amount set forth as the amount
due under the first billing of March 5, 1979, the details of which
are set out supra.

These work in progress printouts list several

additional charges each month up through 3-29-80 when the total
reached $2,007.47, an amount added to prior bills as set out supra.
The problem the court has with this computer data is that there is
still no breakdown as to whether the work shown therein was for
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Through exhibits and testimony the business entities were
referred to by various names - Brooks Industries, a dba and later
as a corporation, the Ice Cream Store, New York Pasta Co., Pizza
Loft and Wagon or Vanderight, Tanfield Square Associates or R.
Tanfield Brooks Company, Warehouse, Ad House, Shopping Center,
Red Fern, Parkwest Restaurant, Das Gasthaus, and Great American
Hamburger in Alabama.

Some were corporations, some became corpor-

ations, at least one was a partnership, one or more a sole proprietorship.

One exhibit (22-D) showed a breakdown of charges made

in 19 79 and 1980 on work done on Tanfield Square, New York Pasta
Co., and the Ice Cream Store.

Charges reflected thereon show a

breakdown of $356.70 for Tanfield Square, $725.50 for New York
Pasta Co., $1,4 65.93 for the Ice Cream Store together with an amount
of $2,4 37.27 shown as carry back claims on the Ice Cream Store.
Evidence and testimony given at the trial identified payments
made by Brooks over the years as consisting of one $300 cash payment
the two $200 checks, the merchandise credit of $2,217.24 for the
diamond and the carpet, and some minor miscellaneous payments totaling about $200.

From this it is evident that although plaintiff

began its accounting services for Brooks in 1977 and continued
during the four or five years that followed, payments on account
were hard to come by.

It is also evident that plaintiff never

got around to submitting a billing to Brooks until March 5, 1979,
at which time the billing submitted was for $7,290.00 with the
breakdown on that billing disclosing nothing as to what amounts
represented work for Brooks as c.n individual or for which business

TEBBS, SMITH V •• BROOKS

PAGE EIGHT

MEMORANDUM DECISION

I have summarized the various accounting statements submitted
by plaintiff to Brooks, but no documentary evidence was offered
which constituted any sort of a written response by Brooks to the
billings made or any wri tten request for a break down, as to which
entity any particular work was done.

Brooks offered only his oral

testimony of oral requests made for such a breakdown,.

While an

apparent feeling of brotherliness seemed to exist between Tebbs
and Brooks from the beginning so that Tebbs did not appear concerned
about billing and getting paid during the first couple of years
for all the work done and Brooks appeared contented to receive
the benefit of such services with little or no concern about seeing
that plaintiff was paid for any of the work that was being done
for him.
Brooks filed two answers to the complaint.

In the first

he denied receipt of, or being able to locate the complaint, as
might be expected with commencement of the action by a ten day
summons ris wets done iii this case,

The amended answer filed January

20, 1984, constituted nothing more than a general denial of the
allegations of the complaint.

No affirmative defenses such as

the statute of frauds or the statute of limitations or the absence
of necessary parties were asserted.
I believe that the evidence clearly preponderates in showing
that plaintiff performed substantial accounting services at Brooks'
request over a number of years for which it was not compensated
and a gross injustice v/ould result under the facts and circumstances

TEBBS, SMITH V. BROOKS

PAGE NINE

MEMORANDUM DECISION

of this case to allow Brooks to escape complete liability therefor
on the sole basis that such services should have been paid by the
various business entities operated by him.

However, I note that

after the parties had agreed to settle the account for $6,000.00
with monthly payments thereon of $200 to be paid, and two such
payments were made in April and May, 1983, plaintiff filed this
lawsuit on June 6, 1983, without prior notice that the agreed to
settlement was no longer in effect.

Both parties were at fault

in the method by which the account was handled.

I thus find the

issues on plaintiff's complaint in favor of plaintiff and against
the defendant and award judgment in the amount of $5,600 with interest thereon and costs.

No attorney's fees are awarded.

BROOKS' COUNTERCLAIM
Brooks' counterclaim contains two counts for damages, one
alleging breach of contract and the second alleging negligence.

The

alleged basis of each claim is that plaintiff was employed by Brooks
to prepare certain accounting documents such as a balance sheet,
an uncompleted projects list, and a profit and loss statement, for the purpose of enabling Brooks to submit a bid on a project for the Intermountain Power Project.

The evidence showed

the bid had to be filed by 2:00 p.m. on June 1, 1982, and that
the accounting report was to be submitted to Earl D. Brown of the
bonding company in the morning of that day.
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Evidence disclosed that Tebbs was advised by Brooks on May
20, 1982, that he had received an invitation to bid on a job for
IPP and that he would need some help in putting some information
together for a bond and told him to contact Brown, as the information would be needed by June 1.

Tebbs assigned the work to Randy

Jensen on May 28, 1982, told him it was for bonding purposes, and
that he would have to work over the week end to get it done by
June 1.

Jensen called Brooks and arranged for a 2:00 p.m. meeting

time on May 28.

Jensen was also told by Brooks that the statement

was for bonding purposes.

Brooks was told by Jensen that when

it was completed, it had to be signed by Tebbs.

Jensen testified

it was his recollection that it^was to J^e^delivered to the bonding
company by 10;00 a.m. on June 1.
Jensen also testified that when he met Brooks at the latter1s
office on the 28th, he had no information concerning the state
of Brooks1 records and asked him for the journals he would need
to prepare the intended financial statement which included a general
ledger, an accounts receivable journal and an accounts payable
journal.

Brooks said he had no such journals and used a chalk

board to explain to Jensen his operations and accounting methods
and showed him what records he had.

Jensen told Brooks that due

to the condition of the records he doubted that he could do much
for him.

Jensen said this made Brooks mad so he told him he would

do the best he could but doubted it would be adequate to meet the
requirements of the bonding company as Jensen knew them to be.
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Working over the week end Jensen put together a balance
sheet but could not prepare an income statement and told Brooks
this was the best he could do.

The document prepared was received

into evidence as exhibit 38-D and was described as Ma balance sheet
of Brooks Industries", a proprietorship, as of May 31, 1982. Included therein is a letter to Brooks dated June 1, 1982 which stated
that the compilation was limited to presenting, in the form of
financial statements, information that "is the representation of
management".

It further stated "we have not audited nor reviewed

the accompanying balance sheet and, accordingly, do not express
an opinion or any other form of assurance of it".

The letter cone-

eluded with this paragraph:
"Management has elected to omit the statements of income,
changes in financial position and changes in proprietors1
equity, and substantially all of the disclosures required
by generally accepted accounting principles. If the omitted
statements and disclosures were included in the financial
statements, they might influence the user's conclusions
about the Company's financial position, results of operation
and changes in financial position. Accordingly, this
balance sheet is not designed for those who are not
informed about such matters."
The balance sheet showed current cash assets of $10,894,
three receivables totaling $475,995, estimated revenues in excess
of billings on

uncompleted contracts of $4 7,515, furniture and

equipment at an estimated value of $20,565, or total assets of
$554,969.

Liabilities and proprietor's equity were reflected to

be accounts payable $151,642, billings in excess of estimated revenues on uncompleted contracts (as shown on an attached schedule)
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of $367,606, accrued expenses of $6,761, and the proprietor's equity
of $35,045, for a total of $554,969.
Notes to the balance sheet included statements that the
company followed the percentage of completion method of reporting
income on contracts, which method recognized income as the contracts
progressed according to the ratio of costs incurred to total estimated costs; that the amount billed but not collected was reported
as contract estimates; that furniture and equipment were included
as estimated values provided by the proprietor; that no provision
was made in the balance sheet for any tax effects on the net income;
and that the balance sheet "reflects only assets, liability, and
equity of the company and does not purport to include all the assets
and liabilities of the proprietor."
Jensen said this exhibit was a "compilation statement" which
is a compilation of information furnished by the client and that
information is taken without confirmation or verification, and
that an adequate statement would have taken from two to three weeks
to prepare.
Brooks testified Jensen called him on the afternoon of May
29, told him the work was done and ready for typing and someone
would come in to type it and that it would be ready for 8:00 a.m.
on June 1 but that Tebbs would have to sign it.

Jensen testified

that this was so and that he had been instructed that the statement
was to be_delivered directly to the bonding company on the morning
of June_l.

Brooks testified that he called the plaintiff about
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9:15 a.m. and was told the statement had been delivered.

Brooks

received no word from the bonding company until he called about
11:45 a.m. and talked to Earl Brown and was advised the statement
had not been received.

Brooks then called Jensen.

Jensen advised he had given the statement when signed by
Tebbs to the secretary with instructions to deliver it to the bonding company, the name and address of which were written out for
her by Jensen.

When Brooks advised Jensen Brown said it had not

been delivered, Jensen made inquiry of the secretary who was to
deliver it who stated that she had been subsequently instructed
by plaintiff's officer manager to deliver it directly to. Brooks'
office rather than to the bonding company and so she had done so,
the only explanation being that such documents were normally delivered to the client.

The statement was then found by Brooks

to be lying on the counter at the defendant's office.
Brooks testified that when he was first advised by Brown
the statement had not been received, it was just before noon and
Brown said it was then late in the day and he was to have received
it early.

Brooks did not thereafter talk further to Brown but

sent Gillespie to Brown about 12:30 p.m.

Brooks testified that

with this development, he concluded the best thing to do was to
get an overdraft position and cashier's check from the bank and
to not get the bond.

At trial it was brought out that Brooks had

testified in his deposition that the statement was not delivered
to Brown on June 1 by defendant after its discovery in his office.
However, the contrary was proven at the trial.
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Upon a note dated

5-19-82 Brown had recorded that Brooks wanted to know what it would
take to bond $1,000,000 for supply contracts as he was interested
in providing equipment to I.P.P of about $600,000.

The notation

stated Brooks was to deliver that day his personal and corporate
financial statement and that he Mneeds line of surety credit by
June 1".
Brown testified Brooks called the next day (May 20) and
asked for clarification.

Brown also made a hand written note on

that day saying the bond was to be in Brooks personal name and
the personal and corporate financial statement would be coming
and prepared by a CPA.

Brown testified in talking to Brooks they

discussed both a bid bond and a supply bond and he told Brooks
what would be needed to put it together.
Brown further testified he received the financial information on June 1 which was brought in by Harry Gillespie about noon.
Brown said he already had a personal financial statement of Brooks'
personally, dated April 15, 1982, but he would want and needed
a personal and a Brooks Industries' statement of the same date.
After talking to Harry Gillespie on June 1, Brown dictated
a memo for his file and when typed, he made handwritten corrections
on it.

The memo was placed into evidence as Exhibit 40-P, was

dated June 1, 1982, and, as corrected, reads as follows with the
handwitten changes being noted by underlines

TEBBS, SMITH V. BROOKS

Re:

PAGE FIFTEEN

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Brooks Industries

Skip Brooks had Harry of Brooks deliver a. May 31, 1982
compilation statement. It did not contain a Profit and
Loss. While I did not understand all of the items on
the statement due to lack of supporting notejs, it appeared
the proprietorship's net worth was approximately $35,000.00.
We also had an April 15, personal statement which appeared
to include some of the asset items shown on the May 31
proprietorship statement. There were payables shown on
the personal which did not appear on the business statement as A/R. Client wasn't able to tell me if the
payables were paid - uncommon dates made comparison impossible.

y
All in all, there were m^y questions which Brooks was
unable to explain to me 'satisfactorily and I told him
we were unable to provide them the bid bond. I also
recommended he not post any form of cashiers check or
letter of credit since I wasn't convinced we would be
able to provide performance bonds even if we had all the
details.
He asked me to give the personal and business financial
statements back to Harry, and he might recontact us
to -tagaft and set up future surety credit.
It is defendant's contention that because of the negligent
failure to deliver the financial statement directly to the bonding
company as directed before noon on June 1, he was unable to
obtain the bond to submit to I.P.P. by 2:00 p.m. that day, but
that had a bond been furnished he as low bidder would have made a
10% profit of $61,000, which amount he claimed by way of damages
on his counterclaim.

Some evidence was presented in support of

this damage claim, but Richard Prouse testified that all such bids
were submitted subject to the final approval of I.P.P.

Prouse

testified that his position with I.P.P. was such that when I.P.P.
opened the bids they were submitted to him for review as to meeting requirements, including the bond, following which he would

TEBBS, SMITH V. BROOKS

PAGE SIXTEEN

MEMORANDUM DECISION

make his recommendation to I.P.P. as to bids to be accepted, but that
I.P.P. made the final determination although they usually followed his
recommendation.

He could not recall if Brooks submitted a bid on the

project (#10) in question.

At the trial Brooks testified he had in

fact been awarded three bids by I.P.P. on other projects.
At the conclusion of the evidence plaintiff in support of a
motion to dismiss brought out that defendant made no claim the content
of the financial statement prepared by Jensen was in error; that the
misdelivery was immaterial because when Gillespie delivered the financic
statements to Brown there was still time to get a bond but that Brown
had established that he issued no bond because of discrepancies in the
financial statement prepared by plaintiff and that prepared by Brooks;
that Brown had called Brooks when he got the statement and told him
he was not going to give him the bond; that Brooks merely told Brown
to have Gillespie return the statements; that even though Brooks knew
about noon he would not get the bond, he did not go to his bank, althoug
he had about two hours in_ which to do so, and that in any event the
banker had testified that by then Brooks had already drawn down "his
$10,000^'; that no evidence had been offered as to the requirements for
the job or that Brooks' bid met those requirements; that although defend
ant established that the records were then in Los Angeles, he made no
showing of any effort to obtain that evidence nor that it could not
be

obtained; that there was no showing of the net profit allegedly lost

on a claimed gross profit of 10% of bid; that there was only specula-
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tion as to whether he could have gotten a performance bond had he
been awarded the bid; that there was no evidence offered that he had
made any profit on his bids he had been awarded on C.P.P. projects;
that the claimed lost profits were too speculative and the law
required that such be established with reasonable certainty with
the fact of, the causation for, and the amount of, lost profits
being shown; and that while case law held (664 P2d 1161) that a
new business must be allowed to prove lost profits by reasonable
evidence, Brooks Industries was not a new business and no evidence
had been offered proving any types of evidence suggested in the
case law as being acceptable to prove lost profits.
These comments of plaintifffs counsel touch upon the failure of defendant to prove the ^legations of his counterclaim by
a preponderance of the evidence, which of course he had the burden
of doing.

Based upon the record before the court such contentions

have merit.

I note here that while as to plaintiff's claims against

him, Brooks pressed hardjtiis contention that services were performed for his various entities for which he here had no liability,
yet^as to his counterclaim he asserts it on behalf of himself, not
Brooks Industries, ignoring completely the distinction between the
two.^
Be that as it may, and without regard to the aforementioned
deficiences as to proof of damages, it is very clear in this case
that the basis of the claims asserted in the counterclaim is the
negligence of plaintiff in delivering the financial statement to
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Brooks' office rather than to Earl Brown at the bonding company.
It is equally clear that Brownes refusal to issue the required
bond was based solely upon the lack of sufficient information upon
which a bond could be approved and not because of the late delivery
to him of the financial statement prepared by plaintiff.

The inade-

quacy of the information furnished to Brown was based primarily upon
the lack of adequate records as maintained by Brooks which precluded
the preparation of a sufficient financial statement upon which
the bonding company could base a responsible decision.

As noted,

Jensen recognized at the outset and so stated to Brooks that the
inadequacy of the available records as produced by Brooks almost
guaranteed that a sufficient financial statement for bonding purposes could not with certainty be produced.

The very content of

the financial statement itself reflects the uncertainty and the
inadequacy of the record information.
Thus, as I view the counterclaim^proof of proximate cause
as an element of the claim falls far short of meeting the burden
of proving such by a preponderance of the evidence.

In my opinion

the testimony of Earl Brown clearly establishes that such was the
case.

Recognizing that delivery of the financial statement to

Brooks instead of to Brown was negligence, it still inevitably remains that whether it be viewed as negligence or a breach of contract, it was not the reason Brown declined issuance of thejbond.
1

th u s must and do rule in favor of jthe plaintiff and against the

defendant of no cause of action on the counterclaim.

TEBBS, SMITH V. BROOKS

PAGE NINETEEN

MEMORANDUM DECISION

However, I do not find that defendant's counterclaim was
without merit or not brought in good faith and thus plaintiff's
request for attorney's fees under Section 78-27-56 is denied.
Under the Rules of Procedure the parties may by written
stipulation waive formal findings of fact

and conclusions of law.

If either declines to do so, the same are to be prepared by
counsel for plaintiff.

Dated this

yQ

day of April, 1984.
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